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13 August 1965

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


# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

State Dept. review completed

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
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**NORTH VIETNAM** 25X1



## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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\*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)

Communist Military Developments: Preliminary field analysis of a 12 August high-altitude drone reconnaissance mission over the Hanoi area has revealed the presence of possibly two new SAM sites--numbers 9 and 10--in North Vietnam.

Site 9, about six miles east-southeast of Hanoi, reportedly consists of six launch revetments in a star-shaped configuration, a guidance revetment, and three hold revetments. The site appears complete and apparently is operational.

Site 10, about ten miles south-southeast of Hanoi, is apparently in the early stages of construction. The road pattern suggests a link configuration, but only one partially completed launch revetment is visible. Both installations lie inside the ring of five SAM sites earlier established around Hanoi.

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Air Strikes in North Vietnam: Eight buildings were destroyed at the Dien Bien Phu barracks complex as a result of air strikes on 11 and 12 August. No assessment of the 12 August strike against the Thuan Chau barracks has yet been received.

(continued)

Preliminary reports on the armed reconnaissance missions flown on 12 August indicate that approximately 9-12 rail cars along with about 600 feet of track were destroyed on the rail line in northwestern DRV. A ferry boat was also sunk and a number of other targets were damaged.

A US Navy A4E Skyhawk was hit by ground fire over North Vietnam yesterday and ditched alongside the carrier Coral Sea. The pilot was rescued uninjured. This is the eighth US aircraft lost in the past week.

Communist Political Developments: Hanoi's current disinterest in negotiations was reaffirmed by a North Vietnamese diplomat in Cairo in recent conversations with UAR foreign ministry officials.

Expressing confidence in an ultimate Communist victory in the south, the DRV ambassador reportedly registered "strong opposition to any negotiations at this time and irritation with the meddling of Tito and Shastri." Commenting on other peace initiatives, the DRV diplomat characterized the British Prime Minister as a "stooge" and Ghanaian President Nkrumah as a "seeker of publicity." UAR Foreign Ministry officials, on hearing these remarks, assessed the DRV position as extremely inflexible.

French Minister of Culture Malraux came away from his recent discussions in Peiping with the impression that the Chinese position likewise remains "very hard." The Chinese reportedly insisted that there must be an actual departure of US forces before talks and that an agreement in principle to withdraw is not enough. However, Malraux was told that this was really a question for Hanoi and the Liberation Front to decide and that Peiping would abide by their decision.


On the question of direct Chinese participation in the fighting, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi reportedly told Malraux that "as long as there is no enlargement of the conflict, China will not participate."

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## SOUTH VIETNAM



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Chen was apparently deliberately vague about what he meant by "enlargement." Chen also reportedly took the opportunity to complain of alleged repeated US violations of China's airspace. Both points have been raised many times in Peiping propaganda.

The Military Situation in South Vietnam: US and Vietnamese government forces have established no significant contacts with Viet Cong units in the Duc Co area during the past 24 hours. Elements of the US 173rd Airborne Brigade yesterday came under small-arms fire in the vicinity of Duc Co, while the camp itself was subjected to several rounds of mortar fire. No casualties resulted from these incidents.

According to press reports, the airstrip at Duc Co has been re-opened, permitting the landing of supplies and the evacuation of wounded personnel. A sweep operation in the area has apparently been initiated.

Elsewhere, in heavy fighting 15 miles south of Can Tho in Phong Dinh Province, government forces sustained only light casualties while reportedly killing 156 Viet Cong.

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Kashmir: [Clashes are apparently continuing between Indian forces and the Kashmiri infiltration teams from Pakistan.]

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[redacted] [redacted]

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Pakistan's aim in the current Kashmir crisis is to pressure India into a settlement which would eventually lead to Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. [redacted] Pakistan does not believe India will negotiate unless such pressure is brought to bear.]

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[redacted] also noted, as did the recent public statement by Pakistan's foreign minister, that Pakistan no longer has any faith in the effectiveness of the UN to bring about a solution.]

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[redacted] Pakistan realizes its encouragement of guerrilla warfare in Kashmir risks escalation into a larger war.

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[redacted] [redacted]

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[The US Embassy in Karachi has noted a feeling in Pakistan that during the Rann of Kutch crisis the Indians were dissuaded from larger action by fear of possible Chinese Communist intervention. The Pakistanis may feel that the same fear will limit Indian reaction to events in Kashmir.]

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[redacted]

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Disarmament: [The Western delegations at the Geneva disarmament conference have agreed to the presentation on 17 August of the US draft of a treaty banning proliferation of nuclear weapons.]

[Britain has evidently decided not to present its own draft. London still plans, however, to make public its opposition to the provision in the US draft that might under some circumstances permit dropping the requirement that decisions on the use of nuclear weapons in a future Allied nuclear force be subject to a US (and perhaps British) veto.]

[London's course, although less damaging to Allied unity than offering a rival draft, will nevertheless point up the divergency of views among the Allies on the question of a multilateral force.]

[Soviet delegate Tsarapkin reiterated to the press on 11 August the standard contention that Moscow could not accept a nondissemination treaty which left any loopholes for German access to nuclear weapons.]

[Britain may expect that criticism of the US draft by Communist and neutral delegations will ease the way for the subsequent tabling of modified "compromise" language which would be closer to the present UK text.]

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\*Dominican Republic: Last minute rebel intransigency will probably delay a peaceful solution to the Dominican crisis.

Acceptance of the OAS proposed Act of Reconciliation, which would establish a provisional government and elections nine months hence, has run into opposition from Francisco Caamano and his followers. Although rebel negotiators find a number of articles in the act objectionable, the principal issue appears to be the leadership of the Dominican armed forces. Rebel leaders have reversed their earlier agreement to leave this thorny problem to the provisional president and now insist that the service chiefs must go before the installation of the provisional government.

With the exception of the army, the pre-revolutionary leaders of the armed forces, including the national police, remain in office. The removal of these officers, especially Brigadier General Elias Wessin y Wessin, has been a rebel rally cry throughout the rebellion. To many Dominicans, these officers represent the corruption, venality, and brutality that has long plagued their country.

This latest rebel tactic, in a long series of frustrating delays in reaching a settlement, could easily upset the scheduled installation of the provisional government by mid-August. Antonio Imbert, head of the Government of National Reconstruction, has publicly agreed to sign the act, but, if faced with delays, he may well decide to renege. The proposed provisional president Hector Garcia Godoy and his tentative cabinet may decide the task is impossible and withdraw themselves from consideration.

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NOTES

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\*USSR: [Moscow re-entered the London gold market today after a year's absence with sales totaling about \$35 million. Continued gold sales are expected to defray the foreign exchange costs of recent large purchases of wheat. During the past week the USSR ordered nearly seven million tons of Canadian and Argentine wheat worth approximately \$500 million. At the beginning of this year, estimated Soviet gold reserves stood at \$1.5 billion.]

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\*Greece: King Constantine's refusal late yesterday to grant former premier Papandreou a mandate to form a new government or to call for elections continues the serious political crisis. Papandreou, who reportedly would have agreed to a short-term government headed by a nonparliamentary figure, apparently refused to support another Center Union (EK) deputy as premier. Meanwhile, there are continuing efforts to gain support for former interior minister Tsirimokos, considered the King's most likely choice for premier-designate; however, certain conservative elements are reluctant to support Tsirimokos because of his leftist background.

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Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U. S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

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The National Indications Center

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